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CASE NOTES
Because the automobiles produced by defendants were not
equipped with pollution control devices, they cost less, performed
better, and used less gasoline, To a resident of an area where the
pollution problem is minimal, these considerations would outweigh
the benefits of the devices. Retrofit ordered under section 16 would
ignore these regional differences. Under the Air Quality Act of
1967 12 the federal government has preempted the regulation of
new-car emissions in every state but California.'" The states, how-
ever, retain the power to regulate the emissions from used cars.'"
Thus states where the pollution problem is greatest have the option
of requiring pollution control devices to be installed. Such measures
impose the cost of pollution control on the users of automobiles,
which does not seem inappropriate, since the cost would have been
borne by car users had the devices'been installed in earlier years. A
decision for the plaintiffs in this case would have imposed the cost
on the automobile industry, which would then have passed it on to
future car buyers. Any proposed solution to the automobile pollution
problem involves a decision as to who will bear the cost. Congress
has considered legislation that would have required automobile
manufacturers to "retrofit" used cars with pollution control devices,
as well as a proposal that the government subsidize the retrofit (thus
distributing the cost to all taxpayers). Both proposals were
rejected." 5 It is submitted that the decisions in Vehicle Air Pollu-
tion were correct in leaving to the legislative branch the decision of
where the burden of paying for pollution control should fall." 6
HARRY H. WISE III
Environmental Law—Admiralty Law—Validity of States' Oil
Pollution Sanctions—Askew v. American Waterways Operators,
inc. 1 —Plaintiffs, merchant shippers, world shipping associations,
members of the Florida coastal barge and towing industry, and
owners and operators of oil terminal facilities and heavy industries
located in Florida, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida to enjoin application of the Florida
Oil Spill Prevention and Control Act (the Florida Act). 2 Officials
112 42 U.S,C. §§ 1857-571 (1970).
113 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6A(a) (1970).
114 See Comment, The Clean Air Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from
Congress, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 571, 597 (1971).
115 Id. at 598, citing S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970),
116 Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Congress provided for mandatory licens-
ing of pollution-control equipment where there is a danger that one manufacturer might
achieve a monopoly because of its advancement in pollution-control technology. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857h-6 (1970). Thus Congress provided an arrangement similar to the one attacked by the
Justice Department in Vehicle Air Pollution.
411 U.S. 325 (1 9 7. 3).
2 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.011-.21 (Supp. 1972). 355 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971); see
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responsible for enforcing the Florida Act were named as defendants,
and the State of Florida intervened as a party defendant asserting
that its interests were much broader than those of the named
defendants. 3 Plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Florida Act on
several federal constitutional grounds. First, plaintiffs contended
that Florida sought to legislate substantively in the constitutionally
mandated, exclusive federal admiralty domain. 4 Second, plaintiffs
claimed the Florida Act violated the commerce clauses since the
Florida Act constituted an undue burden on interstate and foreign
commerce in the area of marine commerce. 6 Finally, plaintiffs
411 U.S. at 327. The United States, the American Bar Association and the Maritime Law
Association of the United States filed briefs as amici curiae urging affirmance of the district
court judgment. The States of California, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New York (joined by Connecticut and Delaware), North Carolina, Texas, Virginia
and Washington filed briefs as amici curiae urging reversal of the district court judgment. Id.
at 326-27.
3 411 U.S. at.327.
See 355 F. Supp. at 1244. Several commentators have noted the opinion of the trial
court. See, e.g., Kinder, Vessel Owner's Liability to the States for Oil Pollution Damage, 2
Env. Affairs 562 (1972); Swan, Challenges to Federalism: State Legislation Concerning
Marine Oil Pollution, 2 Ecology L.Q. 437 (1972); Note, Toward a State Remedy for Oil Spill
Damages: An Insurance Approach?, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 60 (1972).
Plaintiffs claimed that the Florida Act unconstitutionally intruded into the exclusive
domain of federal admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of six grounds. First, it imposes
unlimited liability on vessels and terminal facilities for state cleanup costs and property
damage without proof of negligence. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp. 1972). Second, it
suggests the allowance of private plaintiff recovery for property damage. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§
376.12, .14(3) (Supp. 1972). Although the language of § 376.12 does not explicitly state that
vessels or facilities are liable to private parties for costs of cleanup or other damages, §
376.14(3) states in pertinent part:
Any claim for costs of cleanup, civil penalties, or damage by the state, and any claim
for damages by an injured person, may be brought directly against the bond, the
insurer, or any other person providing evidence of financial responsibility.
The Act thus suggests that private causes of action for cleanup costs and damages exist.
Third, the Act requires vessels and terminal facilities to maintain evidence of financial
responsibility by insurance or surety bond satisfactory to the state. Fla. Stat. § 376.14(1)
(Supp. 1972). Fourth, it compels compliance with state regulations prescribing equipment
and procedures for the prevention, containment and removal of oil spills by prohibiting
certain vessels and terminal facilities from operating without licenses issued by the Florida
Department of Natural Resources. Ha. Stat. Ann. § 376.06(1)(8) (Supp. 1972). The only
vessels subjected to the licensing requirement are those "used to transport oil, petroleum
products or their by-products, and other pollutants between the facility and vessels within
state waters." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.06(4) (Supp. 1972). Fifth, the Florida Act subjects
facilities and some vessels to state inspection. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.07(2)(a) (Supp. 1972). This
section empowers the Department of Natural Resources to adopt inspection requirements for
vessels and facilities. Section 376.06 specifically deals with licensing requirements and proce-
dures. Finally, the plaintiffs stated that the Act establishes a coastal protection fund to be
used to meet certain limited administration, abatement and rehabilitation costs, which fund
was financially maintained , by license fees and polluter reimbursement. Fla. Stat. Ann. §
376.11(1) (Supp. 1972). This provision provides in pertinent part: "To this fund shall be
credited all license fees, penalties, and other fees and charges . . . ."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause grants Congress the power "To
regulate Commerce with the foreign Nations, and among the several States . ."
6
 335 F. Supp. at 1245. Specifically, plaintiffs objected to the state's imposition of
unlimited liability on vessels engaged in foreign and interstate commerce, the operational and
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challenged certain individual state provisions as denials of due
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
At trial, a three-judge federal court held the Florida Act void as
an unconstitutional intrusion into the federal maritime domain. 8
Accordingly, the trial court did not consider the other constitutional
claims. 9
 The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, reversed and
unanimously HELD: that the waiver of preemption in the Water
Quality Improvement Act (WQIA) 1 ° is valid and that the police
power of the state of Florida is sufficient to permit Florida, in the
present setting of the case, to establish any "requirement or liability"
concerning the impact of oil spillages on its interests or concerns."
In particular the Court noted that the exclusive domain of federal
admiralty jurisdiction extends only to encompass the vessel-crew
relationship. 12
 The Court further stated that in the present setting of
the case it could not find any statutory conflict or preempton that
would prevent Florida from enforcing legislation which establishes
requirements for vessels and imposes a strict standard of liability
upon the marine transfer of oil."
The Askew decision is significant in several respects. First, it
expands the permissible scope of state remedial action against tor-
tious activity cognizable under the traditional federal admiralty
jurisdiction and establishes that the expanded area of federal
admiralty jurisdiction does not in any way impede state remedial
legislation." Further, the Askew decision establishes that state
legislation which provides for state and private damages for marine
oil spill consequences is compatible with federal enactments on the
subject. is Finally, the Askew opinion suggests that states can impose
financial responsibility requirements and operational regulations
upon those engaged in the interstate transfer of oil without running
afoul of constitutional objections." In short, Askew is significant
because it allows states jurisdiction over torts traditionally subjected
to the exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction and it permits states to
regulate--to the extent of imposing financial responsibility and
operational requirements—those engaged in interstate commercg.
The finding of constitutionality in Askew carries the suggestion HQ.
inspection requirements running to vessels, and the containment gear provision, since these
provisions imposed a burden on interstate commerce. Brief for Appellee American Waterways
Operators, Inc. at 63, 67, 70, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325
(1973).
U.S. Coast. amend. XIV. See 335 F. Supp. at 1245.
11 335 F. Supp. at 1246.
9
 Id. at 1245.
1 ° 33 U.S.C.	 1161(0(2) (1970).
11 411 U.S. at 328.
12
 Id. at 344.
13
 Id. at 328. It should be noted that the Court left open the possibility of conflict in the
future when the Florida Act was actually interpreted or enforced.
14 See text at notes 70-71 infra.
15
 See text following note 71 infra,
16 See text at note 107 infra.
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other states may similarly legislate specifically in the oil spill area,
despite the existing federal admiralty remedies and the federal
enactments in the area.
This note will examine the broad question of the extent to
which a state may legislate in the admiralty area. Specifically, the
traditional remedies to prevent and remedy oil spills available to
federal, state and private plaintiffs will first be examined, noting
several factors that have mitigated the value of remedial action.
Next, the federal legislative response to traditional remedial
difficulties will be explored, followed by an exposition of the
legislative response of Florida. Thereafter, this note will examine
the several constitutional barriers to state legislation, which, like the
Florida Act, attempts to provide a state remedy for a tort cognizable
under federal admiralty jurisdiction and further attempts to regulate
a subject of interstate commerce. After analyzing the holding in the
Askew decision, it will be submitted that the Court adopted an
improvident basis of reasoning in overcoming one constitutional
difficulty presented by the Florida Act. Prior to Askew, state
legislation in the admiralty area was invalid if it altered the standard
of liability existing in admiralty or imposed financial responsibility
requirements on vessels engaged in interstate commerce. The Askew
Court implicitly abandoned this determinative criteria and redefined
the area of exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction to encompass
only the particular factual situation involving the relatiori between a
vessel and its crew. It will be submitted that this redefinition will
carry undesirable ramifications.
An examination of the remedies historically available for
damage caused by oil spills reveals that federal, state and private
plaintiffs could obtain relief in both federal and state courts;"
however, litigants were subject to certain limitations in both forums.
In federal courts, plaintiffs could invoke federal admiralty
jurisdiction" and seek to impose liability for an oil spill using
theories based on negligence or unseaworthiness." Nevertheless, the
See generally Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 Ford. L. Rev. 155, 164-80
(1968).
18 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This constitutional provision confers upon federal courts
judicial powers "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction . . . ."
The admiralty jurisdiction is defined "by reference to maritime matters, but these in turn
are defined with regard to the character of the waters where or with reference to which the
given transaction or occurrence takes place." G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty
28 (1957). More specifically, the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States
extends to all waters, salt or fresh, with or without tides, natural or artificial, which
are in fact navigable in interstate or foreign water commerce, . . . whether or not the
occurrence or transaction that is the subject-matter of the suit is confined to one
state.
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted).
19
 Liability for the maritime tort of oil pollution has required proof of causation, see
Salaky v. The Atlas Barge No. 3, 208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953), and proof of negligence, see
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 217 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1954). At least one commentator
has suggested unseaworthiness as an inappropriate basis for recovery in oil spill cases. Swan,
832
CASE NOTES
potential use of federal admiralty jurisdiction against oil spill
damage was severely restricted by the jurisdictional prerequisite that
the injury claimed by• the , plaintiff had to be consummated on
navigable waters. 20 Accordingly, federal admiralty jurisdiction
could not be invoked for shoreside injuries although the injury
originated in navigable waters. However, in 1948, Congress enacted
the Admiralty Extension Act (AEA) 2 ' which extended the scope of
federal admiralty jurisdiction to encompass all injuries caused by a
vessel on navigable waters, thereby including injuries to the shore or
shore property. In short, it is only within recent times that federal
jurisdiction has provided a means of relief for all consequences of oil
spills.
Correspondingly, federal, state and private plaintiffs have had
the opportunity to seek relief from oil spills in state courts. Although
states have been precluded from granting relief for matters within
federal admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the exclusive grant of
admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts, 22
 relief in state courts
has been available for oil spill injuries outside the federal maritime
jurisdiction. However, the enactment of the AEA and the
consequent extension of federal maritime jurisdiction has made the
continued viability of state court remedies for the effects of oil'spills
questionable.
Regardless of the forum chosen, the plaintiff's remedy for the
tort of oil ' pollution may prove illusory. 23 The first obstacle to
successful litigation and the impOsition of liability is the problem of
proof. Since oil spills often occur at sea, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove the source of the spill. 24 Crew members of the
discharging vessel might be the only witnesses available and they
might refuse to admit to the involvement of their ship. Similarly,
proof of negligence or unseaworthiness, the two basic theories of
supra note 4, at 458 n.145. Accord, Cardinale v. Union Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Cal.
1956))
" Federal admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to damages to a seaside wharf and
packing house destroyed by a fire originating On a ship in navigable waters. The Plymouth, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865). However, an oil spill from a pipeline on shore which caused damages
to vessels within a yacht basin was considered within the cognizance of federal admiralty
jurisdiction since the injuries were consummated on navigable waters. Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 339 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1964).
2]
 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970). This statute provides in pertinent part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and
include all cases of damage or injury,•to,
 person or property, caused by a vessel on
navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consum-
mated on land.
22
 See text at note 50 infra.
23
 See Note, supra note 4.
24
 See Salaky v, The Atlas Barge No. 3, 208 F. 2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953). One court,
recognizing the extreme difficulty of proof of negligence ir actions against vessels for damage
from oil spills, held that the application of the doctrine s r res ipsa loquitur was appropriate
and justified the determination that the vessel was negligent. California, by and through its
Dep't of Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth,318 F. Supp. 839, 841-42 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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maritime tort recovery, might be complicatedd by the unwillingness
of crew members to testify to coworker negligence or to testify
against the interest of their employer, the owner of the vessel.
Further impediments to recovery are the provisions of the Limited
-Liability Acts (LLA), 25 which may insulate a prospective defendant
fully or partially from a damage award. Moreover, even if the LLA
does not apply, a prospective defendant might be financially incapa-
ble of meeting a judgment. If the'polluter possessed limited assets,
the available cause of action in either federal or state courts would
be meaningless as a practical matter. Thus, although remedial ac-'
tions in federal and state courts have been available to prospective
plaintiffs, resort to these remedies may be unsatisfactory in many
circumstances.
Recognizing the inadequacy of existing remedies to combat oil
pollution, Congress in 1970 enacted the Water Quality Improvement
Act, 26
 which in part provides the federal government a new means
to recover costs incurred in oil spill cleanup operations. 27 In partial
alleviation of the prior difficult standard of proof, the WQIA im-
poses strict liability upon vessels and oil facilities for oil spills. 28
Further, the WQIA establishes liability ceilings of $14 million and
$8 million for vessels and facility owners respectively, and under
certain circumstances imposes unlimited liability or totally exempts
prospective defendants from liability. 29 Additionally, the WQIA
establishes a requirement that vessels provide satisfactory evidence
of financial responsibility—either by posting a bond or satisfactorily
establishing insurance coverage—to insure collection of cleanup
costs to the federal government when it is entitled to such
recovery. 30 Further, the WQIA attempts to strengthen operating
25 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1970). In substance the LLA either exonerates the owner of a
vessel from liability or limits his liability to the value of his interest in the then pending freight
of the vessel. 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1970). However, if it can be shown that the owner knew of
the negligence or that the act in question was committed or performed at the direction of the
owner, liability is unlimited. 46 U.S.C. § 183c (1970).
The LLA has been applied in suits against vessels even when the tort was not within
federal admiralty jurisdiction. Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96, 106 (1911).
zn 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1155, 1156, 1158, 1160-75 (1970). The WQIA was amended
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
(Supp. II 1972). Since the WQIA was in effect at the time of the enactment of the Florida Act,
it, rather than the 1972 Amendments, will be the subject of analysis in this note.
27 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161(a)-(p) (1970).
2° 33 U.S.C. § 1161(f) (1970).
4° Id. Unlimited liability will be imposed where "the United States can show that such
discharge was the result of willful negligence or willful misconduct within the privity or
knowledge of the owner." Id. Liability will be excused where
an owner or operator can prove that a discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of
God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part of the United States Government,
or (D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to whether any such act or
omission was or was not negligent, or any combination of the foregoing clauses . . . .
Id.
3° 33 U.S.C. § 1161(p)(1) (1970). Only vessels over 300 gross tons must comply with this
section. Id.
834
CASE NOTES
requirements for vessels and facilities involved in the marine trans-
fer or distribution of oil by providing authority for federal regulation
designed to prevent and control oil spills by establishing required
procedures and equipment. 31 Despite this grant of authority, such
preventative regulations were not immediately promulgated. 32
Rather, the federal government developed regulations under another
section of the WQIA providing for a National Contingency Plan to
direct oil spill cleanup operations. 33
As helpful as the WQIA may be for the recovery of federal oil
spill cleanup costs, 34 the enactment affords no assistance to state
and private plaintiffs attempting to recover for cleanup costs and
property damage." Additionally, although the WQIA was ad-
dressed to oil spill prevention and control, the federal regulations
focused on cleanup operations and federal notification rather than
pollution prevention via equipment regulations. 36 Hence, in 1970,
after the enactment of the WQIA and a series of local oil spills with
resultant serious damage, the Florida legislature enacted the Florida
Act. In broad approach, the Florida Act attempts to prevent future
oil spills by subjecting enterprises engaged in the marine transfer or
distribution of oil or other hazardous substances to operating re-
quirements and seeks to brighten the remedial picture by insuring
financial responsibility and providing a state cause of action for oil
spills founded on strict liability. 37 As noted above, 38 the Florida Act
imposes a licensing requirement which prohibits facilities from
operating without licenses to prevent and control oil spills. In order
to obtain and retain state licensing, carriers must comply with state
regulations pertaining to essential equipment and procedures for oil
spill prevention, control and removal promulgated by the State
Department of Natural Resources; the Florida Act provides that
3 ' 33 U.S.C. § 1161(j)(1)(C) (1970).
32
 The Coast Guard proposed equipment and operational requirements for vessels and
facilities in 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 24,960 (1971). However, it was not until Dec. 1972 that the
Coast Guard issued equipment and operational regulations that will become effective July 1,
1974. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 154-56 (1973).
33
 35 Fed. Reg. 8508 (1970).
34
 For comments on the inadequacies of the WQIA, see generally Barry, The Evolution
of the Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the
Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1103 (1970); Printz, Water
Quality Legislation: Past and Present, 9 Houston L. Rev. 690 (1972); Statutory Comment,
The Control of Pollution By Oil Under the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 27
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 278 (1970); Note, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 973 (1970).
35
 It should be noted that the 1972 Amendments provide authority for reimbursement of
state cleanup costs. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(cX2)(H) (Supp. II 1972).
36 Compare 35 Fed. Reg. 8508 (1970) with 33 C.F.R. § 151 (1970).
31
 In explaining the Florida Act's underlying premise, the State of Florida stated in its
brief to the United States Supreme Court: "Continued protection of maritime interests to the
detriment of the state and its citizens is no longer justified in an era of sophisticated maritime
insurance and super-tanker." Brief for Appellant at 16, Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
31 See text at note 4 supra.
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compliance with these regulations is a condition precedent to is-
suance or renewal of the necessary license. 39
 In addition, the Florida
Act responded to a void in practicable remedial action available to
state and private citizens to combat oil spill consequences—a void
created by the inefficacy or prior state and private remedial action
under both• federal admiralty and state court jurisdiction and not
filled by the enactment of the WQIA. The Florida Act brightens the
remedial picture by attempting to ameliorate several of the problems
that had previously undermined adequate relief for oil spill conse-
quences. To recover under the Florida Act, the state does not need
to prove negligence; rather, the Florida Act provides that the state
may recover all its cleanup costs by merely pleading and proving
that a prohibited discharge has occurred." With respect to private
plaintiffs the Florida Act appears to create a cause of action cogniz-
able in Florida courts.'" Additionally, by its terms, the Florida Act
purports to impose unlimited liability upon carriers and facility
operators for state cleanup costs and oil spill damage incurred by the
state and private persons. 42 Mandatory evidence of financial respon-
sibility provided by insurance or surety bonds maintained by termi-
nal operators and vessels as required by the Florida Act relieves the
problem of financially irresponsible defendants by guaranteeing
available money for meritorious state and private claimants.'"
Finally, the coastal protection fund also guarantees reimbursement
to the state for certain administrative and cleanup expenses."
Further, the Florida Act attempted to supplement the WQIA in
respect to oil spill prevention and_ control regulations, perhaps
spurred by specific provisions of the WQIA calling for state aid to
the federal removal plans. 45
Subsequent to the 'passage of the Florida Act, the federal
government enacted another piece of legislation directed to oil spill
control. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (Ports and
Waterways Act)46
 authorizes the federal government to control and
regulate vessel traffic, to establish procedures for the transfer and
handling of certain substances, to establish minimum
 safety
39 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.06(3) (Supp. 1972).
40 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp. 1972). See note 4 supra.
41 Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 376.12, .14 (Supp. 1972). See note 4 supra.
42 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp. 1972). See note 4 supra.
43 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.14 (Supp. 1972). See note 4 supra.
44
 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.11 (Supp. 1972). See note 4 supra.
4s The WQIA in several provisions encourages state action. In regard to the National
Contingency Plan, the President is to assign duties and responsibilities in coordination with
state and local agencies. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(c)(2)(A) (1970). Additionally, the chemical disper-
sants schedules are to be drawn in cooperation with the states. 33 U.S.C. § 116l(c)(2)(G)
(1970). Under 33 U.S.C. § 116I(j)(1)(B) (1970), the President is directed to establish criteria for
the development and implementation of local and regional contingency plans. Further, in 33
U.S.C. § 1161(o)(2) (1970), there is a waiver of preemption as to the states' imposition of "any
requirement or liability" with respect to oil discharges, while 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o)(3) (1970)
contemplates some state regulation of facilities.
46
 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (Supp. II 1972).
836
CASE NOTES
standards for structures, and to establish rules and regulations with
respect to the design and construction of vessels. 47 The Act specially
provides that it does not "prevent a State or political subdivision
thereof from prescribing for structures only higher safety equipment
requirements or safety standards than those which may be described
pursuant to this title."'" Thus, at least in regard to facilities, states
may establish higher equipment and safety requirements than those
established under certain federal standards. The federal act is silent
on the imposition of state safety and equipment requirements on
vessels. In essence, the federal act is preventative in nature and
seeks to protect the navigable waters and resources of the
environment from harm resulting from vessel or structure damage,
destruction or loss. 49
An examination of precedent in constitutional law reveals
several potential barriers to a state enactment which, like the
Florida Act, attempts to provide a remedy for oil spill consequences
and also attempts to regulate subjects of interstate commerce. One
objection to the Florida Act is that it unconstitutionally intrudes
upon the exclusive domain of federal admiralty jurisdiction, since it
provides for remedial actions in state courts. This objection stems
from the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal
courts," and section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provides:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have, exclusively of the
courts of the several States, . . exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, ... saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of
a common law remedy, where the common law is
competent to give it . . . . 51
As early as 1892 the Supreme Court recognized that federal
admiralty jurisdiction encompassed an exclusive domain. In
Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 52 the Court upheld state legislation which
created a wrongful death action in state courts despite the fact that
no similar remedy existed under federal admiralty jurisdiction. In
response to defendant's contention that the federal admiralty
jurisdiction was exclusive, the Court replied that the federal
jurisdiction is exclusive only to the extent that it encompasses in rem
actions." Similarly, the Court four years later in Sherlock v.
Alling54
 upheld another state wrongful death statute which provided
a remedy in state court. Although the defendant ship owner in
17
 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. II 1972).
48
 33 U.S.C. § 1222 (Supp. II 1972).
49
 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (Supp. 11 1972).
5°
 See note 18 supra.
31
 Ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970).
52 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
33
 Id. at 533-34.
54
 93 U.S. 99 (1876).
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Sherlock did not explicitly refer to the exclusive federal admiralty
jurisdiction, he did claim that the Indiana wrongful death provision
would interfere with interstate commerce. 55
 The Sherlock Court
examined the defendant's objection but found to the contrary that
the state enactment was valid. The Court especially noted that the
act was not particularly directed at those engaged in interstate
commerce, but, rather, was generally applicable to persons engaged
in all callings, 56 and that the state statute only "indirectly and
remotely" affected the operation of commerce. 57
Several years later, in 1893, in The City of Norwalk," the
extent to which state legislation could provide a state remedy
notwithstanding federal admiralty jurisdiction was again considered
in a federal court. In Norwalk the administratrix wife of an
employee who was killed in the course of his employent aboard ship
invoked the federal admiralty jurisdiction and brought a wrongful
death action in federal court founded on a state statute. 59
Responding to the assertion that the state wrongful death action
unconstitutionally intruded into the exclusive domain of federal
admiralty jurisdiction, Judge Addison Brown stated:
There seem, therefore, to be at least three classes of
subjects, (none of them affecting, however, what is pecu-
liar to the general maritime law, or touching its
international or interstate relations,) in which state
legislation is competent to affect the rights of parties in
courts of admiralty, in the absence of legislation by
Congress, viz.: (1) In the establishment of general rights of
persons and property within the state limits; (2) in the
exercise of the police power; (3) in certain local regulations
of a maritime nature."
Thereafter, Judge Brown found that the wrongful death statute
fulfilled all three criteria, since the statute, first, was a general law
affecting personal rights irrespective of any relation to maritime
activities; second, was directed at protecting life and averting
pauperism and dependency of workers' survivors—matters within
the state police power; and, finally, was local in scope and did not
interfere with either interstate or international interests or the
necessary uniformity of maritime law." Accordingly, the court
permitted the application of the state wrongful death statute despite
its impact of providing a remedy not available in admiralty. In so
doing, Norwalk established broad criteria to determine the extent to
" Id. at 102.
56 Id. at 103.
57 Id. at 104.
56
 55 F. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
59 Id. at 100.
66 Id. at 108.
61 Id.
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which a state statute providing for state remedies can validly deal
with subjects of federal admiralty jurisdiction.
Subsequent to the Norwalk decision, the Supreme Court in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen 62 rejected a state statute as
impermissibly intruding on the exclusive sphere of federal admiralty
jurisdiction. In Jensen, the widow of a dock worker recovered an
award from a state workmen's compensation board, despite the
objections of the employer-vessel owner that the remedy under
federal admiralty jurisdiction was exclusive. 63 The Court, in a 5-4
decision, noted the provisions of the New York law imposing
liability with proof of negligence and requiring employers' financial
responsibility by either joining a state fund, insuring with a private
insurance group, or providing proof of financial ability to cover
damage awards for injuries to employees. The Court concluded that
the state had intruded on the exclusive domain of federal admiralty
jurisdiction, finding that it impinged upon the harmony and
uniformity essential to the administration of admiralty law. 64 In so
doing the Court stressed the difficulty of accurately defining the
permissible scope of state legislation:
[Iit would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with
exactness just how far the general maritime law may be
changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That
this may be done to some extent cannot be denied. . .
Equally well established is the rule that state statutes may
not . . . affect the general maritime law beyond certain
limits. . . . [Pilainly, we think, no such legislation is valid
if it . . works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations. 65
Nevertheless, the Jensen Court concluded that the workmen's
compensation law did interfere with the uniformity needed in
interstate affairs involving maritime subjects.
Three years after Jensen, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart," the Court stressed that the requirements of uniformity in
the maritime area were imposed by constitutional mandate. After
the Jensen decision, Congress purported to change the Jensen result
by amending the Judiciary Act in such a manner as to make the
federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction non-exclusive over
claimants under any state workmen's compensation act. 67 The
62
 244 U.S. 205 (1917),
63 Id. at 209-10.
" Id. at 217.
65
 Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
66 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
67 Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395. A second amendment to the Judiciary Act,
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Knickerbocker Court ruled the amendment unconstitutional,
reiterating the Jensen view that the application of various state
workmen's compensation laws on subjects in federal maritime
jurisdiction would create an impediment to the fundamental
function of the admiralty clause—the preservation of harmonious
and uniform rules in maritime matters provided by federal control."
After the Court in Jensen and Knickerbocker held
unconstitutional this application of state workmen's compensation
laws to subjects of federal admiralty jurisdiction, the Court in 1921
reexamined the constitutionality of the application of state wrongful
death actions to maritime subjects. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia 69
the Court allowed application of a state wrongful death action in a
suit brought under federal admiralty jurisdiction. In Garcia, an
employee was killed while working in the hold of a-ship chartered to
his employer. 70
 After his death, the employee's survivors, invoking
federal admiralty jurisdiction, successfully brought an action in
federal district court seeking damages for the employee's wrongful
death as provided by a state statute. 7 ' After noting that the action
was in personam, the Court held that the wrongful death action was
local in character and would not interfere with the necessary
harmony and uniformity of admiralty law. 72 Therefore, the Court
determined that such an action did not unconstitutionally intrude
upon the exclusive domain of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Several
years later the Court reached a similar result when considering the
application of another state's wrongful death statute." In sum, an
examination of decisions involving state statutes which extend state
jurisdiction over tortious activity cognizable in federal admiralty
jurisdiction reveals that such statutes have been upheld only when
they have been found consistent with the uniformity and harmony
thought to be essential to federal admiralty law. Although the Court
has proffered no test for determining whether a particular state
statute passes constitutional muster, a comparison of the Court's
decisions reveals that statutes which impose liability upon proof of
negligence have been found acceptable, while those which impose
strict liability upon subjects of federal maritime jurisdiction and
establish operating prerequisites—e.g., the acquisition of insurance
coverage—have been found violative of constitutional demands.
A second constitutional barrier to state enactments which, like
the Florida Act, may affect and govern the operations of enterprises
similar to the first, was declared invalid in Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219,
223 (1924).
68 253 U.S. at 164.
69 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
7° Id. at 238-39.
71
 Id. at 239.
" Id. at 242.
73 Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941). A state survival statute was enforced in
admiralty court to permit an injured plaintiff to bring suit against the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor. See id. at 391-92.
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engaged in interstate commerce, derives from the interaction of the
commerce clause with the supremacy clause. 74 In the past,
whenever federal statutes—enacted by Congress pursuant to its
power under the commerce clause--have conflicted directly with
state legislation, such state legislation has been declared
unconstitutional, as dictated by the supremacy clause. Hence, in
McDermott v. State of Wisconsin," a state law requiring certain
food and drug labelling to the exclusion of all other labelling was
held void, since compliance with the state statute would comprise a
violation of federal laws pertaining to food and drug labelling.
Similarly, in Campbell v. Hussey, 76 a state enactment establishing
standards of classification and inspection for tobacco products was
declared unconstitutional as conflicting with the provisions of a
federal statute designed to create uniform standards.
However, state legislation governing matters of interstate
commerce has been upheld despite an apparent conflict with federal
legislation. Hence, where federal legislation has established a
minimum requirement, stricter state legislation has been upheld, 77
as has state legislation directed at a purpose different than that of
federal legislation. 7 8
State enactments affecting subjects engaged in interstate
commerce have also met with constitutional objection on the distinct
grounds that the state legislation has been preempted by federal
legislation. Hence, in Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Porter, 79 state
legislation prohibiting exculpatory clauses in bills of lading was
found invalid in view of Congress' intent in passing a federal
enactment authorizing carriers to determine the substance of bills of
lading. Similarly, in Erie R.R. v. New York 8 ° the Court found that
federal legislation providing for regulation of the working conditions
of certain employees was intended to be comprehensive, and
therefore struck down state legislation with stricter standards
designed to accomplish the same objective. Nevertheless, when
federal legislation has been found to be noncomprehensive in intent
the preemption argument has failed. For example in Skiriotes v.
Florida, 8' the Court held that a federal enactment limiting the size
of certain commercial sponges did not preclude state legislation
limiting diving apparatus used in the same enterprise. In sum, even
74 U.S. Const. art. VI, The supremacy clause states in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
15 228 U.S, 115 ( 1 9 1 3).
79 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
" Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
78 Huron Portland Cement Co. v, City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
79
 273 U.S. 341 (1927),
8° 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
81 313 U.S, 69 (1941).
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though a state enactment does not explicitly conflict with a federal
enactment, it may be found unconstitutional if it is determined that
Congress intended the federal act to preempt the field. 82
Finally, state legislation affecting subjects engaged in interstate
commerce hazards the risk of another constitutional objection. Con-
sidered apart from any federal legislation, state enactments may be
found in violation of the commerce clause if they interfere with
interstate commerce. As early as 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden 83 the
Court enunciated the proposition that the commerce clause pre-
cluded states from enacting legislation governing interstate com-
merce. In Gibbons the Court considered the validity of an exclusive
license to operate vessels within a state's territorial waters." After
first establishing that Congress alone can regulate interstate
commerce," and further indicating that,Congress may adopt either
prospectively or retrospectively state legislation regulating interstate
commerce," the Gibbons Court found that the state law in question
offended a federal enactment and could not therefore be upheld. 87
Similarly, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of
Philadelphia 88 the Court recognized that some subjects demanded
exclusive federal regulation, even though the Court there deter-
mined that local pilotage laws did not intrude upon interstate com-
merce so as to deny their validity. Subsequent to the Gibbons and
Cooley decisions the Court rejected state legislation which it found
unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce. Hence, in
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell89 state legislation prescribing
maximum train speeds at railroad crossings was found to be con-
trary to the interests of interstate commerce and was therefore
declared invalid. Further, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona," the
Court found unconstitutional state laws governing the maximum
length of trains as interfering with interstate commerce. In discus-
sing the criterion to be applied in determining the validity of such
state legislation, the Southern Pacific Court stated: "[W]ithout con-
trolling Congressional action, a state may not regulate interstate
commerce so as substantially to affect its flow or deprive it of needed
uniformity in its regulation. . . . 91
 It can be inferred from these
opinions that state legislation purporting to regulate subjects of
interstate commerce may encounter constitutional objections unless
the local legislation has specifically been adopted by Congress.
" See Note, 13 B.C. Ind. Sr Corn. L. Rev. 813, 815 (1972).
" 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
84 Id. at 2.
" Id. at 88.
" Id. at 91.
r Id. at 97.
ea U.S. (12 How.) 318, 340 (1851).
" 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
" 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
91 Id. at 779-80.
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To briefly summarize, state legislation which, like the Florida
Act, first attempts to provide a state remedy for activity which is
subject to the federal admiralty jurisdiction and also attempts to
regulate subjects engaged in interstate commerce encounters several
constitutional barriers. To the extent that such legislation purports
to provide a state remedy against a party subject to federal admir-
alty jurisdiction, it may be declared unconstitutional if, like
workmen's compensation statutes imposing financial responsibility
requirements and liability without proof of negligence, it is found to
impair the necessary harmony and uniformity of admiralty law.
Correspondingly, insofar as a state enactment purports to regulate a
subject of interstate commerce, such an enactment may be found
unconstitutional, first, if it directly conflicts with federal legislation;
second, if it attempts to regulate an area over which federal regula-
tion was intended to be exclusive; or, third, if it merely imposes
burdens on interstate commerce.
After analyzing the applicable constitutional precedents the
Supreme Court in Askew limited the Jensen constraints on state
jurisdiction over tortious activity encompassed within the traditional
scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction—i.e., torts consummated on
navigable waters. The Court indicated that only state legislation
that purported to alter the existing maritime liability between a
vessel and its crew would be unconstitutional. 92 Thus, if state
legislation did not alter this relationship it would pass constitutional
muster and would not interfere with the uniformity and harmony
essential to the admiralty domain. Accordingly, the Florida Act
could impose a remedy for oil spill injuries sustained at sea even
though this remedy differed from the existing remedy in admiralty.
In addition, the Court held that a state court could provide a
remedy for torts encompassed within federal admiralty jurisdiction
by virtue of the AEA,—i.e., torts consummated on land, such as
shoreside injuries—since the AEA was not designed to oust
shoreside pollution from the permissible sphere of state regulation. 93
The Court noted that an exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction
which deprived states of their police powers in areas traditionally
outside the admiralty domain was not an intended result of the
AEA. 94
 Hence, the Florida Act, which provided for state jurisdic-
tion over shoreside injuries sustained from oil spills, was found
constitutionally permissible.
The Court in Askew further concluded that the Florida Act did
not fatally conflict with certain federal enactments. First, the Court
noted that it could not find any "statutory impediment" in permit-
ting Florida to establish any "requirement or liability" concerning
the impact of oil spills in Florida's interest or concerns. 95 In respect
92
 411 U.S. at 344.
93 Id. at 341.
94
 Id. at 341, 343.
95 Id. at 328.
843
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
to the WQIA, the Court held that the imposition of liability by the
Florida Act for recovery of state and private damages was not in
direct conflict with the WQIA liability provisions since they encom-
passed only federal cleanup costs. 96 Second, as to the imposition of
unlimited liability on vessels and facilities by the Florida Act and its
potential conflict with the dollar limits established in the WQIA, the
Court declined to resolve the issue until actual conflict did arise. 97
Further, the Court stated that the imposition of liability without
fault was not in conflict with the WQIA since the federal act applies
only to the federal government and leaves the states free to impose
their own standards of liability. 98
 As to the Florida requirements of
evidence of financial responsibility on facilities and vessels, the
Court simply stated that there was no conflict with the WQIA. 99
Finally, the Court stated that the imposition of operating regulations
on facilities and vessels by Florida as a prerequisite to licensing was
-not per se invalid, despite the fact that the WQIA provided for
federal regulations. Rather, the Court decided that it should await a
concrete dispute between federal and Florida regulations."° In
short, the Court concluded that all provisions of the Florida Act
were, in the present setting of the case, compatible with the WQIA.
Analyzing the relationship between the Florida Act and other
federal enactments, the Court concluded that no conflict between
the LLA and the Florida Act had yet been presented so as to
warrant declaring the Florida Act unconstitutional. Noting that the
LLA applies only to vessels and that an award under the Florida
Act in excess of the liability limits of the LLA would likely be
unconstitutional, the Court commented that the Florida Act was
susceptible to a construction by the Florida courts which would be
in harmony with the federal act. 101 The Court also noted that the
Florida Act which peimitted state regulation of facilities did not
conflict with the Ports and Waterways Act, since that federal
enactment allows states to prescribe standards which go beyond the
minimum federal requirements. 102
In regard to the federal preemption issue, the Court held that
there was no preemption since the WQIA by its own terms did not
intend to preempt state imposition of liability or requirements. 103 It
should be noted that the Court does not mention a possible distinc-
tion which could be made between state legislation which attempts
to impose "any requirement or liability with respect to a discharge of
99 Id. at 331.
97 Id. at 332.
98
 Id. at 331.
" Id.
1 " Id. at 337.
11 ' Id. at 331.
292 Id. at 337.
103 Id. at 329. The Court referred to 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o) (1970), which contains a waiver
of preemption.
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oil" 1 " and state legislation which imposes requirements on vessels
before the fact of a discharge. Further, the Court did not consider
the possible constitutional invalidity of the waiver of preemption. In
an earlier case, Knickerbocker, the Court struck down a federal
amendment to the Judiciary Act attempting to validate state legisla-
tion in the admiralty jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that it was
beyond the authority of Congress to grant this power to the states. It
might be argued that the Askew Court failed to consider the need for
uniformity in the admiralty area where interstate commerce is af-
fected. The Askew Court found state police power sufficient to
justify the federal waiver of preemption in the WQIA which encour-
ages states to impose liability on those traditionally encompassed in
the admiralty jurisdiction.
Finally, by broadly stating that it could find "no constitutional
or statutory impediment"'" to the Florida Act, the Court suggested
that the Florida Act did not impede interstate commerce so as to be
invalid without regard to federal enactments. Specifically, provi-
sions of the Florida Act which may impede interstate commerce are
the financial responsibility requirements and the operational regula-
tions of vessels.'" The Askew Court did not however, specifically
analyze the Florida Act in terms of this particular commerce clause
objection. 107 Accordingly, since it found no intrusion into the exclu-
sive domain of federal admiralty jurisdiction, no direct conflict with
federal enactments, and no preemption by federal enactments, the
Court upheld the Florida Act as constitutional.
An analysis of the Askew decision suggests that the Court
regrettably departed from precedent in testing the validity of the
Florida Act under the admiralty clause. The Court determined that
a state may provide a remedy for tortious conduct occurring within
the traditional scope of the federal admirality jurisdiction, i.e., for
torts occurring on navigable waters. This determination in Askew
sanctions state legislation in the admiralty domain so long as such
legislation does not affect the legal relationship between a vessel and
its crew. As noted above,' 08 earlier Supreme Court decisions have
found state wrongful death actions constitutionally permissible,
1 °4
 33 U.S.C, § 1161(o)(2) (1970).
1 ° 5
 411 U.S. at 328.
'°' See note 4 supra.
107
 The Court's implicit finding might be challenged through an assertion that Florida's
imposition of operating and financial responsibility requirements impedes interstate com-
merce, considered apart from any federal legislation. Hence, it might be argued that the
Florida Act requirements, as applied to vessels, liken the Askew decision to those cases
involving state-imposed requirements on railroads. See text at notes 89-90 supra. However, to
rebut such an assertion, the contention could be made that the WQIA specifically contemp-
lates state regulation of such vessels. See 33 U.S.C. 1161(o) (1970). If such a contention were
adopted, the WQIA could be viewed as establishing state regulations as federal law. Accord-
ingly, in light of the Gibbons decision, state legislation of a subject of interstate commerce
could be considered constitutional. See text at note 83 supra.
1118 See text following note 73 supra.
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which actions were technically survival statutes that "kept alive" an
employee's claim against an employer despite the employee's death
and permitted the estate or next of kin to prosecute the claim. 109 In
addition, a comparison of prior cases has revealed that state reme-
dial legislation was constitutional if it did not impose a standard of
liability less strict than negligence or require one within the admir-
alty domain to meet financial responsibility requirements.'"
The change enunciated in Askew in the determinative criteria
has both desirable and undesirable implications. First, the adoption
of the vessel-crew relationship as the critical factor in determining
the scope of the admiralty clause, and thus its constraints, allows
states to develop and apply a standard of liability stricter than that
of negligence—the standard used in admiralty law—to vessels. At
first glance, different state standards of liability appear permissible,
since different state standards would not impede the operation of
vessels. By means of comparison, trucks and railroads may be
subject to varying state standards of liability for tortious conduct
since some states may have adopted comparative negligence stan-
dards which might affect these interstate carriers. However, it
should be noted that the allowance of differing state standards of
liability as applied to vessels will give rise to a situation comparable
to that in existence prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins," wherein
the law applied to the tortious conduct will depend on the choice of
state or federal court. In the case of vessels, unlike the situation
involving trucks, railroads or planes, where conflict of laws doc-
trines might be able to mitigate the possibility of results depending
on the forum chosen, the presence of an applicable body of federal
law—i.e., admiralty law—affords room for the development of a
forum-shopping situation.
A second criticism of Askew arising from its adoption of the
vessel-crew relationship as the determinative factor of the scope of
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction centers on the sanction of state
financial responsibility requirements imposed on vessels for admir-
alty clause purposes. In the instant case, the financial responsibility
requirement can arguably be supported with reference to the
WQIA," 2 since the WQIA does not address state cleanup costs, yet
it envisions state imposition of liability and responsibility. It might
appear anomalous if the WQIA allows a state to impose liability yet
fails to allow the state to insure recovery. A narrowing of the Jensen
decision to factual situations involving the vessel-crew relationship
carries the implication that after Askew in other contexts
—as, for example, that of insuring payment of wrongful death
claims—states may impose financial responsibility requirements on
109
 See text at notes 55, 57, 61, 69 and 73 supra.
11 ° See text following note 73 supra.
111 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
112 See text at note 99 supra. The authorization of financial responsibility by the WQIA
may be asserted to be unconstitutional. See text following note 104 supra.
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subjects of admiralty jurisdiction so long as the vessel-crew relation-
ship is not breached and the application of state police power can be
justified. Such a result might be undesirable, since states may have
differing insurance standards and satisfaction of the standards of
one state may be unsatisfactory to another state. Thus, ships may be
subjected to undue burdens when they are involved in interstate
activities.
The Askew decision has a positive effect to the extent that it
employs the crew-vessel relationship as determinative of the scope of
federal admiralty jurisdiction in respect to the remedies available to
crew members. Under Askew, crew members are still relegated to
their remedy in admiralty, and, thus, the limitation espoused in
Askew avoids the forum-shopping problem sought to be eliminated
by Erie. Additionally, the opinion can be endorsed because states
normally lack the necessary interest to justify the Erie problem in
the area of vessel-creww relations unless a crew member is a citizen
of the particular state. However,' it is submitted that the Court
might have avoided the several aforementioned" 3
 undesirable re-
sults by adopting a more restrictive reading of the admiralty clause
restrictions on states providing remedies for tortious activity within
the traditional confines of admiralty jurisdiction. By interpreting the
Jensen decision more broadly and therefore denying the validity of,
at least, those provisions of the Florida Act which substantively
lessen the federal standard of liability or impose financial responsi-
bility requirements on matters within the federal admiralty jurisdic-
tion, the Court would have avoided both the potential Erie problem
and the potential problem pertaining to varying state financial re-
sponsibility requirements.
In conclusion, the Askew Court held the Florida Act to be
constitutionally permissible state legislation under the admiralty
clause. The Court limited Jensen and its progeny to those situations
affecting the legal relationship between a vessel and its crew. Such a
narrow reading of Jensen may result in a proliferation of state
legislation with varying standards, of liability which will undoub-
tedly undermine the uniformity and harmony of admiralty law in
the tort area, and may engender forum-shopping to take advantage
of differing state and federal remedies for the tort of oil pollution.
Further, such a narrow reading of Jensen may permit varying state
financial responsibility requirements to be imposed upon those en-
gaged in maritime activities. The, narrow reading might thereby
subject vessels to undue burdens in their interstate or foreign ac-
tivities. It is submitted that the Askew Court could have avoided
this possible invasion of the harmohy and uniformity in the admir-
alty domain by a broader reading of the traditional constraints
emanating from the admiralty clause.
113 See text at notes 109-11 supra.
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